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managed to deliver innovation in large-scale ‘megaprojects’. These megaprojects are 
notorious for high rates of failure that conventionally evoke organizational strategies 
avoiding risks and uncertainties. Yet strategies for managing risk and uncertainty are 
essential to the routines and innovation that overcome the challenges of successfully 
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This paper aims to contribute to understanding of how organizations respond 
to risk and uncertainty by combining and balancing routines and innovation. It 
shows how approaches to risk and uncertainty are shaped by the contractual 
framework in large multi-party projects. The paper addresses a gap in the 
literature on how risk and uncertainty is managed to deliver innovation in 
large-scale ‘megaprojects’. These megaprojects are notorious for high rates of 
failure that conventionally evoke organizational strategies avoiding risks and 
uncertainties. Yet strategies for managing risk and uncertainty are essential to 
the routines and innovation that overcome the challenges of successfully 
delivering large-scale, complex projects. 
 
Since the pioneering research of Joan Woodward in the 1950s and 1960s, the 
relationship between innovation and industrial organization has been 
understood to be influenced by the scale and standardization of production 
(Woodward, 1965). The mass production of standardized products poses very 
different organizational challenges than the production of customized small 
batches. When production is unique and one-off, as in projects, organization 
is more likely to be exploratory, and less able generally to exploit economies 
of scale and established routines (March, 1991). Innovation is commonly 
associated with risk (Wiseman and Bromley, 1996), and risk is greater where 
organizational objectives are unknown or emergent. 
 
There are huge stakes involved in the successful execution of large projects 
resulting from the common failure to achieve original cost, time and quality 
objectives; large commitments in financial capital; integration of advanced 
technologies; lack of alignment among stakeholders; and system accidents or 
failure (Perrow, 1984; Shapira and Berndt, 1997; Miller et al., 2000). Recent 
literature on “large-engineering projects”, “grand-scale construction projects”, 
and “megaprojects” suggests that there has been an accelerated growth since 
the early 1990s in the number, size and diversity of large projects (Shapira 
and Berndt, 1997: Miller et al., 2001; Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). While drawing 
upon various studies of large projects, this paper uses the term megaproject  
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which describes an organizational structure set up to produce a large-scale 
investment in complex infrastructure, such as an airports, high-speed rail 
network, metro system, telecommunications networks, dams, and oil and gas 
pipelines. It is defined as an investment of $1bn or more to produce physical 
infrastructure (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003).  
 
Efforts to eliminate or minimize risks must take advantage of standardized, 
repetitive and carefully prepared routines, processes and technologies. 
However, emergent events and problems encountered during the project also 
require innovative, novel or unique solutions to keep the project on track to 
successful completion. Therefore, managing risks and uncertainties in 
megaprojects involves finding a judicious balance between performing 
routines and promoting innovation.  
 
The research setting for this study is London Heathrow Airport’s Terminal 5 
(T5), and a 10-year research study into its planning, design, construction and 
operation. T5 was a large and highly complex project, with a budget of £4.3 
billion and involving over 20,000 contracting organizations. Overseen by the 
British Airport Authority (BAA), the project client, airport owner and operator, it 
entailed the construction of major buildings, a transit system, road, rail and 
subway links, alongside the world’s busiest airport working at overcapacity. 
The T5 project used a contractual framework that differed considerably from 
industry norms, and encouraged collaboration, supplier responsibility and 
shared risk. The project was delivered to budget and on time.  
 
The following section of the paper presents background literature from a 
range of disciplines on risk and uncertainty in megaprojects. This is followed 
by a description of our research method. We then present our case study of 
the Heathrow T5 Project. A discussion of the case and the importance of 








All types of organizations face the challenge of preparing for an unknown 
future. They must distinguish between the risks of a possible range of 
outcomes from occurring and uncertainties that cannot be predicted. In this 
section, we review the literature on how organizations identify and respond to 
risk and uncertainty in the extreme case of megaprojects.  
 
Risk and Uncertainty 
 
An understanding of how organizations cope with risk and uncertainty must 
start with Knight’s (1921) original contribution. In his view, there is a 
fundamental difference between risk and uncertainty. Both relate to imperfect 
knowledge about a future situation, which depends on the behaviour of an 
indefinitely large combination of objects and is shaped by many factors. Our 
orientation towards the future is inherently ambiguous:  
 
“It is a world of change in which we live, and a world of uncertainty. We 
live only by knowing something about the future; while the problems of 
life, or of conduct at least, arise from the fact that we know so little” 
(Knight, 1921: 199). 
 
Risk is a known chance or measurable uncertainty. The distribution of a group 
of alternative outcomes is known through the use of probability calculations or 
from statistics based on previous experiences. Uncertainty is an 
unmeasurable or truly unknown outcome. It is not possible to identify a group 
of alternative outcomes because the situation being dealt with is highly 
unique. Uncertainty is generally associated with personal opinions or 
judgements about a future course of events that cannot be verified or falsified 
using scientific methods.   
 
Knight (1921) identifies two different ways in which organizations and 
managers reach decisions about how to identify risks. An “intuitive judgement” 
is based on common sense, judgement and estimation.  Decisions about what  
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to expect in a situation, and how to respond to it, are made on the basis of 
what we infer from our knowledge of previous experiences. A “probability 
judgement” is based on either the application of mathematical logic to 
calculate the probability or the empirical method of applying statistics to work 
out the chance of an outcome occurring. Statistical probability is commonly 
used in business, while the mathematical logic rarely applies.  When the 
probability of an outcome occurring is known, it is possible to take actions to 
prepare for the contingency. Taking out an insurance policy to guard against 
risks – such as a fire or tunnel collapse – on a project is an example of how 
such contingencies can be converted into a fixed cost.  
 
Project risks and uncertainties 
 
Previous studies have examined the risks and uncertainties associated with 
large projects from a variety of theoretical perspectives. Shapira and Berndt 
(1997) develop a cognitive-behavioural “risk-taking model” which links 
individual perceptions of risks to some level of aspiration. They identify two 
different decision-making approaches to risk. A “normative approach” uses 
statistical analysis (a form of probability judgement) of large samples of 
repeated events to estimate the probability of an expected outcome. A 
“descriptive approach” (similar to intuitive judgement) claims that people 
evaluate risky alternatives by comparing them to some reference point before 
choosing among them. Empirical research suggests that in practice managers 
define risk as the range of negative outcomes that might result in real danger. 
Managers often do not respond to risk using probability estimates and “feel 
more ‘at home’ with detailed descriptions of particular events, such as the 
‘worst possible outcome’, than with summary statistics” (Shapira and Berndt, 
1997: 307). The risk-taking approach argues that cost and time overruns and 
poor revenue predictions may be due to an over-reliance on descriptive 
decision-making and judgemental errors of managers suffering from cognitive 
biases.  
 
Lessard and Miller (2000) offer a strategic management perspective on risk 




context for decision making. They distinguish between two types of project 
risks: those that can be anticipated, and those that are more difficult to 
predict, but do emerge as the environment becomes more turbulent. 
Increasing uncertainty refers to situations where there is such limited 
knowledge that decision making is ambiguous. Indeterminancy means that 
future outcomes are not only difficult to comprehend, but also depend on a 
variety of exogenous and endogenous events that can produce a variety of 
alternative outcomes.  
 
Flyvbjerg et al (2003) develop a sociological perspective to examine the 
interests and power relations involved in managing megaproject risks. They 
identify a “megaproject performance paradox”. Despite the growing number 
major projects being built around the world and opportunities to use 
experience gained to improve performance, many projects have poor 
performance records. Cost and time overruns, failures to achieve the desired 
outcomes, and lower-than-predicted demand and revenues undermine the 
viability of projects. A major cause of the megaproject paradox is inadequate 
understanding that “the world of megaproject preparation and implementation 
is a highly risky one where things happen with only a certain probability and 
rarely turn out as originally intended” (Flyvbjerg et al., 2003: 6). In their view, 
project risks should be explicitly acknowledged by all of the stakeholders – 
such as business, NGOs, scientific and technical interests, media and users – 
involved a project. By promoting greater accountability towards risk, all 
stakeholders can participate in a carefully designed set of deliberative 
processes through all phases in the project life cycle. 
 
The risk-management perspective developed by Loch et al (2006; see also 
DeMeyer et al., 2001; Pich et al., 2002) claims that many projects fail because 
organizations do not appreciate the difference between project risk and 
project novelty. Project risk is defined as the probability of an event’s 
occurrence and the extent of impact on a project if the event does occur. 
Project novelty refers a combination of unforeseeable uncertainty (rather than 
risk) and complexity. Complexity is defined as the number of system 
components, project tasks, stakeholder relationships and the interaction  
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between them. An example of a novel project is one established to move from 
an organization’s traditional capabilities into the unknown terrain required to 
develop new technologies and markets. Whereas it is possible to prepare for 
risky projects, novel projects are difficult to plan due to such a high degree of 
uncertainty or complexity, or both. However, managers can make use of two 
different techniques to cope dynamically with project novelty: “learning” 
provides a flexible way of adapting a project approach as more knowledge 
and experience is gained about the project, its environment and their 
interactions; and “selectionism” makes use of multiple approaches, each 
running simultaneously but independently of each other, and selecting the 
best one.  
 
Shenhar and Dvir (1996 & 2007) provide an analysis of projects, uncertainty 
and complexity using concepts derived from contingency theory and 
innovation studies. They argue that most projects fail because managers do 
not understand the uncertainty and complexity involved and fail to adapt their 
project management approach to each unique situation. They have developed 
a diamond model for analyzing the four dimensions shaping the benefits and 
risks of a project. The model is devised to offer an assessment of risk by 
breaking a project down into components (the four dimensions) and focusing 
attention on the resolution of riskier dimensions to improve the chances of 
success (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007: 173). (1) Novelty represents the uncertainty 
of the project’s goal and the risks associated with misunderstanding a 
customer’s needs. (2) Technology represents the project’s level of 
technological uncertainty in terms of how much new technology is integrated 
into the product and risks of overruns associated with higher levels of 
technological uncertainty (Shenhar, 1993). (3) Complexity refers to the 
complexity of the system produced and the risks associated with coordinating 
and integrating its components. (4) Pace refers to the risks of failing to meet a 









Organizational Response to Risk and Uncertainty 
 
The literature shows how a megaproject is an extremely risky and uncertain 
endeavour when we consider a number of dimensions, such as the level of 
complexity and interdependence of tasks, ambiguity in choices in areas such 
as technology, diversity of stakeholders with different interests, novelty and 
time challenges, and managerial decision making dependent upon intuition.  
 
Managers responsible for a managing a megaproject must decide what form 
of organization is required in response to risk and uncertainty. In organization 
theory, the main difference between a project and repetitive operation is the 
“uncertainty about what to do in projects, which must be resolved by 
decisions” (Stinchcombe and Heimer, 1985: 26, original emphasis). In 
repetitive operations such as high-volume manufacturing, productive tasks are 
well known and stable because they are carefully planned, standardized and 
repeated on a daily basis. Located at the extreme one-off and bespoke end of 
Woodward’s (1965) typology of industrial organizations, a project has to deal 
with many unforeseen, unique and rapidly changing circumstances (Davies 
and Frederiksen, 2009). In highly uncertain projects such as the construction 
of offshore oil and gas platforms, each new situation must be confronted 
flexibly on the basis of the previous experience and knowledge of the 
managers and organizations involved. Under such a high degree of 
uncertainty, each part of a project must be “administered as it if were an 
innovation or response to an unusual happening” (Stinchcombe and Heimer, 
1985: 26). 
 
Decisions must be reached about how a megaproject is organized to strike a 
balance between repetitive operational routines and innovative problem-
solving behaviours. Routines refer to repetitive and predictable patterns of 
productive activity involved in operations that are “visibly ‘the same’ over 
extended periods” (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 97; March and Simon, 1958: 
13). An organization’s previous experience, learning and tacit knowledge are 
embodied in well-defined routines stored in its organizational memory. Written  
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records and other explicit knowledge play a role in maintaining an 
organization’s memory, but organizations only remember when they perform 
routines (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The concept of “exploitation” refers to the 
routine behaviour and organizational learning involved in refining and 
extending an organization’s existing capabilities and improving the 
performance of current routines (March, 1991).  
 
Innovation refers to the changes in an organization’s routines or new 
combinations of previous routines required to create new products, processes 
or services in response to new opportunities, unusual circumstances or 
problems (Nelson and Winter, 1982). The concept of “exploration” refers to 
the innovative behaviour and organizational learning involved in problem-
solving, risk taking and experimenting with unfamiliar alternatives (March, 
1991).  
 
March (1991) emphasizes the trade-off that managers must resolve between 
routine exploitative and innovative exploratory behaviour. An organization that 
focuses almost exclusively on exploring new innovative possibilities at the 
expense of exploitation may suffer from “too many undeveloped ideas and too 
little competence” (March, 1991: 71). On the other hand, an organization 
preoccupied with exploitation and short-term routine-driven improvements in 
performance will miss longer-term opportunities to search for and develop 
new and profitable technological, organisational approaches or markets.   
 
Efforts to achieve a good balance between routine and innovative behaviour 
and learning are closely related to rate of change in the environment. 
Established routines and behaviour are well adapted to performing operations 
under stable conditions and low-levels of uncertainty. However, there may be 
little interest or incentives to engage in exploratory learning or finding 
solutions through innovation. There is a risk that the learning that does occur 
“single-loop” employs defensive routines to resist change and support self-
sealing and self-repeating patterns (Argyis, 1977). Adhering too closely to 




unreflectively and automatically (Starbuck, 1983  and 1985), which prevents 
them from seeking new solutions. 
 
Organizations operating in rapidly changing environments under high-levels of 
uncertainty face a challenge of exploring new alternatives, radically changing 
existing practices and creating new innovative combinations of routines. 
Managers and organizations have to engage in self-reflective “double-loop 
learning” by confronting previously held assumptions and creating new more 
appropriate routines (Argyis, 1977). Second-order learning requires explicit 
decisions to transform the routines, structure and skills in ways that will 
deliberately improve performance and augment capability. When new 
innovations are created to solve a problem or improve performance, 
organizations tend to repeat them until they become new set standardized 
routines (Cyert and March, 1963).  
  
Recent research suggest that while the outcome of a project is a one-off and 
highly customized product, many of the processes involved in its production 
are not necessarily novel or unique. Organizational efficiency can be 
improved by creating standardized processes – or routines – which are 
standardized, simplified and repeated within and across projects tasks 
(Davies and Hobday, 2005; Shenhar and Dvir, 2007; Davies et al., 2009). 
Stinchcombe (1985: 248-249) was the first to draw attention to the importance 
of “project routines” as a central source of efficiency and learning in projects. 
Project routines refer to tacit knowledge and experience required to perform 
clearly defined repetitive tasks, roles and responsibilities. Managers know 
what to do because they have performed the task in the past. Project routines 
can be embodied in project management process guide books and software 
for administering on future projects, so that the efficiency built into routines 
does not disappear when a project is dismantled. Although organizations “use 
project routines to reduce the liability of newness… when things are not 
routine, they are emergencies” which must be dealt with by innovation 
(Stinchcombe, 1985: 249). Project routines are pre-planned and prepared 
approach in anticipation of a predicted uncertainty or event. If and when it 
occurs, appropriate routines are enacted.  Project innovation is a creative  
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response to an unknown happening and the approach required to solve it is 
not known prior to the event.  
 
We suggest that a megaproject is complex structure involving a combination 
of project routines and innovation. Each megaproject is organized to perform 
project routines to (a) manage predictable and known operational 
circumstances (e.g. project management procedures, prefabricated 
manufacturing, Just-In-Time deliveries of material and components) and (b) 
minimize the risk of known uncertainties from occurring (e.g. inadequate 
training in preparation for the operational phase of a facility). However, a 
megaproject must also be organized to provide innovative and unique 
solutions to unknown events or unique happenings that cannot be predicted at 
the outset, but must be resolved to keep the project on track to successful 
completion. Managers responsible for a managing a megaproject must 
therefore decide what form of organizational approach is required to perform 
repetitive operational routines in response to risk, while fostering innovation 
and project-based problem solving to cope with uncertainty.  
 
Contractual decisions: transfer, share or bear the risks  
 
The organizational approach chosen to achieve a balance between routines 
and innovation in response to high levels of risk and uncertainty hinges upon 
the nature of the project contract. Organizations typically face a choice 
between three major forms of contract: fixed-price, cost-plus, or mixed-
incentive contracts (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007: 93-94; Loch et al., 2006: 68; 
Floricel and Miller, 2001).  
 
In fixed-price – or lump-sum – contracts, the client transfers all of the risk to 
the contractor. Fixed-price contracts generally work well at lower levels of 
uncertainty, where risks are known and there is less likelihood of unknown 
happenings from occurring. When fixed-price contracts are used for projects 
with higher levels of uncertainty, it can create high risks for clients and 
contractors. When this type of project encounters unforeseen events, clients 




and time constraints. On the other hand, contractors may incur penalties for 
failing to achieve the project’s original performance targets, but can earn 
additional profits if the scope of the project changes.  
  
In a cost-plus incentive – or cost-reimbursable - contract, the “risks are 
shared” between the client and contractor organizations. The client 
reimburses all costs incurred by the contractor. Under a pain/gain share 
arrangement, the contractor has an incentive of earn additional profits if it 
achieves or exceeds the performance targets. In some forms of cost-plus 
contracts, the client may decide “bear the risks” and invest considerable 
resources in building the capabilities required to lead the project from start to 
finish (Zack, 1996).  
 
In mixed-incentive contracts, a combination of fixed-price and cost-plus 
contracts is used to address the varying requirements of different types of 
projects,  sub-projects or phases in the project life cycle.  A cost-plus contract 
is used during the early development phase of a project to cope with higher 
levels of uncertainty and a fixed-price contract is used at a later stage of 
construction as the level of uncertainty reduces.  In other cases, intermediate 
contract types involving incentive fees, bonuses and penalties, and target 
prices are used to improve the performance of contractors. Some large 
projects use a combination of contracts to run sub-projects. For example, the 
Channel Tunnel between England and France used a cost-plus contract for 
tunnelling, a fixed-price lump sum contract for the construction of terminals 
and installation of mechanical and electrical equipment, and a procurement 
contract for rolling stock (Genus, 1997).  
 
The nature of the contracts shapes the organizational behaviour, relationships 
between clients and contractors, and balance between routines and 
innovation on each megaproject. Risk-sharing contracts based on open-book 
transparency and pain/gain incentives used on offshore oil and gas projects in 
the North Sea were designed to foster collaborative behaviour, trust and a 
partnering approach (Barlow, 2000). In risk-sharing arrangements, the 
balance is tilted towards rewarding innovation and incentivizing problem  
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solving behaviour to cope with many unknown outcomes. In fixed-price 
contracts, by contrast, the emphasis is on transferring responsibility for a 
standardized and routine response because it is assumed that the 
uncertainties are known and understood at the outset. The contractor often 
wins the bid by offering a low price and is encouraged to earn profits arising 
from scope changes. A contractor may be tempted by the opportunity of 
shirking – saving costs by comprising on quality. Such contracts promote 
adversarial relationships between clients and contractors, often ending in 
legal disputes unless both parties can reach agreement. This suggests that 
fixed-price contracts should be awarded on the basis of identified risk and a 
supplier’s capabilities and performance records, rather than lowest price 




This study of the Heathrow Terminal 5 (T5) examines how innovation, risk and 
uncertainty were managed within a single megaproject drawing upon 
collaborative research conducted over a ten-year period (1998-2008).  The 
research aimed to answer two main questions: How did BAA use previous 
knowledge and experience to develop its risk-bearing approach prior to the 
construction of the T5 project? What learning was gained from the 
implementation of the T5 approach during the delivery of the T5 project?  
 
Although the focus of the study was on BAA’s distinctive approach to 
innovation and the management of risk and uncertainty on T5, our efforts to 
answer the above questions benefited from research designed to frame, 
analyze and interpret the project in a wider organizational context. Case 
studies of two adjacent projects (1998-1999) undertaken by BAA while it was 
preparing for the construction phase of T5, enabled us to examine 
experimental efforts to test some of processes subsequently used on T5. 
Interviews with senior managers previously involved in the Heathrow Express 
project (1994-1998) – a new train line connecting with Paddington Station in 
London - enabled us to understand a major project, which became trial run for 




Interviews with managers in Laing O’Rourke (LOR) (2005-2008) provided an 
opportunity to examine the how innovation, risk and uncertainty were 
managed from the perspective of a major contractor  and first-tier supplier 
during the construction phase, revealing the “other side of the coin” of a client 
risk-bearing approach on the T5 project (see Appendix: Interviews on T5). As 
well as BAA, interviews were conducted with British Airways (BA), the 
occupier of T5.  
 
In-depth case studies are appropriate for studying poorly understood 
phenomena (Marshall and Rossman 1995), and where contextualization and 
vivid descriptions of organizational behaviours is important (Lee, 1999).  The 
case study is an appropriate method as the question of innovation, risk and 
uncertainty in the T5 project is exploratory and aimed at theory building (e.g. 
Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 2004). It was selected as it has a number of “rare or 
unique” qualities that make it a logical candidate for “theoretical sampling”, 
and it displays characteristics of a “revelatory case” (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 
2004). T5 presented an unusual opportunity to study a research site in which 
inherent risks and uncertainties are extreme and innovation is a necessity.  
 
CASE STUDY: HEATHROW TERMINAL 5 
 
The following case illustrates the challenges and emergent events, and risks 
and uncertainties, encountered during T5’s long gestation and project delivery 
periods, which shaped BAA’s approach to innovation.  
 
Background to the project  
 
T5 is designed to be the home of all of BA’s domestic and international 
passengers at Heathrow. It has a annual capacity of 30 million passengers 
and designed to be compatible with the A380 airliner, the world’s largest 
aircraft. T5 is a large complex on a site of 260 hectares – the size of London’s 
Hyde Park – between the northern and southern runways at the western end 
of Heathrow. It is comprised of a large four-storey terminal building 
(Concourse A) and a satellite building (Concourse B), which is connected to  
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the main building by an underground people mover transit system, and 62 
aircraft stands. A second satellite building is under construction and scheduled 
for completion in 2010. Additional airfield infrastructure, a 4,000 space multi-
storey car park, a large hotel and an 87-metre high air traffic control tower 
have been constructed on the site. T5 is connected by road links to the 
neighbouring M25 motorway. An underground railway station with branches of 
the Heathrow Express and the London Underground’s Piccadilly Line provides 
fast transportation to and from the centre of London.  
 
Project Life Cycle 
 
The sequence of the decisions shaping BAA’s approach to innovation and risk 
management on T5 will briefly be discussed and plotted against the T5 project 
life cycle. As shown in Figure 1, the project consisted of four distinct but 
overlapping and interrelated phases: (1) planning, (2) design, (3) construction, 








(1) Planning phase – 1986 until Sept 2002 
(2) Design phase – 1989 until around 2004 
(3) Construction phase – Sept 2002 until 27
 March 2008 




Figure 1: Heathrow Terminal 5 Project Life Cycle 
 
 
Planning phase. BAA’s planning for T5 began in 1986 and ended in 2001 
when the project was granted consent to proceed with construction. This 
phase included the longest public inquiry in UK planning history, which lasted 
from 1995 to 1999. As a result of the inquiry, the project was subject to 700 




conditions. The project opening date of 30
th March 2008 was set in 2001 and 
a budget of £4.3bn was established in 2003.  
 
During this planning phase, BAA prepared, developed and refined the novel 
approach that would be used to deliver the project. In a project of such 
strategic importance and risk for BAA, it was decided that the T5 Project 
Director should occupy a position on the company’s main Board to provide 
regular reports about the progress of T5 from planning through design and 
construction to commissioning and to acquire the resources and high-level 
support needed  to overcome any problems hindering its progression.   
 
When Sir John Egan, BAA’s CEO from 1991 to 1999, first began to prepare 
for the delivery of the T5 project in the early 1990s it was widely recognized 
that the UK construction industry had a poor track record in delivering major 
projects. Initially, BAA’s efforts to improve project delivery concentrated on 
developing routines and processes to improve the performance of routine and 
small-scale capital projects. A standardized process called “Continuous 
Improvement Project Process (CIPP) was implemented, which was based on 
a set of replicable processes such as standardized designs and modular 
components, integrated project teams involving BAA, and framework 
agreements to work on a long-term basis with selected first-tier suppliers. 
While this process was developed for less risky capital projects, BAA used the 
experience to prepare a set of standardized processes that could be used on 
T5. Experience with co-operative working on BAA’s smaller projects, such as 
the T4 International Arrivals Concourse and T1 Baggage Handling projects, 
provided a useful testing ground for T5 processes. The specific processes for 
delivering T5 – including lines of reporting, responsibilities and 
accountabilities – were written down in the “T5 Handbook”, originally 
published in 1996 and revised to accommodate subsequent learning. The 
processes outlined in the handbook enabled BAA to develop the “T5 
Agreement” – a legal document which assumed that the client would bear the 
risk on T5 and encouraged collaborative behaviour, designed to improve BAA 




While preparing for T5, BAA was involved in another large project that 
encountered an unforeseen event. The project was brought to a halt in 
October 1994 when one of the main tunnels collapsed after a period of heavy 
rain. At one point, the project was 24 months behind schedule. Unlike T5, the 
Heathrow Express project was a fixed-price contract. Balfour Beatty, the prime 
contractor, was accountable for the risk and solving any emergent problems. 
The automatic response would be to sue the contractor for breach of contract. 
However, as the joint project owner and client, Heathrow Express and BAA 
recognized that they were ultimately responsible for carrying the risk, since 
they would incur the loss of revenues and tarnished reputation associated 
with a heavily delayed service. Adopting improved project delivery processes 
– which BAA was developing at the time – could not resolve this problem. A 
more radical solution was required. The client decided to adopt a risk-bearing, 
cost-reimbursable contractual approach.  
 
Before joining BAA, several senior managers involved in the Heathrow 
Express project, including Andrew Wolstenholme, the future T5 Project 
Manager, previously worked for design engineering firm Arup on a 
megaproject valued at £750m to build the pharmaceutical research facility for 
Glaxco (now GSK). The Glaxco project experienced major difficulties which 
were successfully resolved by adopting practices used on major oil and gas 
projects, including ownership of risk, co-located integrated project teams, and 
open-book cost-reimbursable contracts. Andrew Wolstenholme was 
instrumental in bringing the Glaxco risk-bearing experience and practices to 
the Heathrow Express project. Efforts to recover the tunnel and rescue the 
project enabled the Heathrow Express project to meet the tight target date for 
the project and it opened for service in June 1998. In the view of one senior 
manager, “Heathrow Express was proof of concept that the T5 Agreement 
could work” (Fugeman, 2006). 
 
BAA’s decision to bear the risk on T5 was given added support by a 
systematic case study, undertaken between 2000 and 2002, of every major 
UK construction project over £1bn over the previous decade and every 




that the poor performance of megaprojects was associated with fixed-price 
contracts to transfer risk and responsibility to a prime contractor, such as the 
Channel Tunnel project. Such projects experience cost, time and quality 
overruns because of disputes and legal battles between clients and 
contractors over responsibility for scope changes. BAA’s research found that 
no UK construction project had been delivered on time, within budget, and few 
projects had good safety records. Informed by a statistical analysis of airport 
projects, BAA predicted that without a radically different delivery strategy, the 
project would be £1bn over budget, one year late and result in two fatalities.  
 
BAA’s benchmark study identified poor systems delivery and integration (e.g. 
baggage handling) as one of the main reason why international airports failed 
to open on time. As Andrew Wolstenholme explained, the learning gleaned 
from other airport projects and programmes should have enabled BAA to 
avoid the risk of failure during the systems integration and commissioning 
stage:  
 
“we have a dozen benchmark programmes that we look at, and steal 
the lessons from them. We say look, airports don’t open because that’s 
what happened at Denver, that’s what happened at Chek Lap Kok, and 
all the risks that happen in these programmes we know about, and we 
have documented, and we’re putting in to our live, risk management 
process here” (Wolstenholme interview, 2006). 
 
A more specific study of systems integration in megaprojects, conducted by 
Nick Gaines, BAA’s Head of T5 Systems, found that projects involving a high 
technology component are less successful. The risks of cost and time 
overruns associated with integrating new technology were minimised on T5 by 
the decision to use existing technology and mature products. Where new 
technologies were introduced, they were first installed, tested and proven in 
trial or operational environments, such as one of BAA’s smaller airports, 




BAA’s experience gained on the Heathrow Express project and its research 
on megaprojects demonstrated that despite efforts to transfer responsibility, 
the client ultimately must bear and pay for the risk when a megaproject runs 
into trouble. Under the T5 Agreement, BAA assumed full responsibility for the 
risk and worked in integrated project teams with first-tier suppliers. By 
removing the risk from the supply chain, the T5 Agreement was designed to 
reward high performing teams. This was the first time these twin principles 
were adopted on a UK onshore construction project (NAO, 2005).  
 
When the decision to proceed with T5 construction was announced in March 
2002, the budget of £4.3bn was a huge undertaking for a company with a 
market capitalization of around £8.5bn. BAA took out a £4bn insurance policy 
to cover such a large financial risk. It also negotiated with the Civil Aviation 
Authority, the UK regulatory body, to ensure that BAA was rewarded – or at 
least given some protection – for bearing the risks on T5 (Doherty, 2008: 20).  
 
Design phase. The main design activity started in 1989, when Richard 
Rogers Partnership won a national competition to design a new high-profile, 
iconic building with a 156 metre single-span “wavy roof” and a glass façade. 
BAA and BA worked together with architects and designers in large integrated 
project team to present a coherent conceptual design to the planning inquiry. 
Work on the detailed design drawings continued into the construction phase 
of the project.   
 
An approach called “progressive design fixity” was adopted in the knowledge 
that it would not be desirable to freeze the design too early on a project facing 
many uncertainties over a long gestation period, including with the outcome of 
the planning inquiry. For example, specifications had to be changed to cope 
with the Airbus A380, which was not fully developed when the original design 
was agreed. Progressive fixity was supported by the “last responsible 
moment” technique, which identified the latest date that a design decision 
could be taken (Dogherty, 2008: 78). Three different designs were developed 
to address unforeseen events that impacted on the project during the design 




at Kings Cross Tube station, and stringent airport security following the 9/11 
terrorist attack.  
 
During this phase, Norman Haste, T5’s first Project Director, emphasized that 
many large projects fail because of insufficient investment in the design: “this 
is when you achieve your biggest wins. You’re never going to achieve them 
during the construction phase.” (Haste, 2006). A single model environment 
(SME) was developed to enable digital coordination of design as well as the 
integration and testing of components during the construction phase of the T5 
project. The SME was a real-time, computer aided design system of digital 
prototyping and simulation to provide photorealistic representation as a 
“virtual walk through” of each final design. The SME supported “last 
responsible moment” decision making by identifying the latest time a design 
could be made before progressing to fabrication and construction.  
 
Construction phase. Construction of T5 was broken down into two sub-
phases: the construction of infrastructure and buildings, from July 2001 to 
March 2008, and the integration of systems and retail fit-out of the buildings, 
from January 2006 to March 2008. It was during construction when the 
“theory of the T5 Agreement was tested” (Egan, 2008).  
 
A separate organization was set up to manage the T5 project, consisting of 
around 300 experienced and highly skilled staff led by a small team of senior 
BAA managers. As the overall systems integrator and project manager, BAA 
divided the construction phase into four main activities: Buildings, Rails and 
Tunnels, Infrastructure, and Systems. These groups were responsible for 16 
major projects and 147 sub-projects, with the smallest valued at £1m ranging 
to larger projects, such as the £300m extension of the Heathrow Express 
underground rail station. The construction phase involved a large network of 
suppliers including 80 first-tier, 500 second-tier, 5,000 fourth-tier, and 15,000 
fifth-tier suppliers.  
 
Relationships between suppliers did not always run smoothly. In a team led by 
LOR, the design engineering firm Mott MacDonald had fallen behind in  
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delivering design drawings. Facing the possibility of falling behind schedule, 
LOR turned to the client for advice. BAA instructed LOR to find a resolution 
within the “spirit of the T5 Agreement”.  LOR and Mott MacDonald had to find 
a way of cooperating by communicating and reinforcing the importance of 
collaborative behaviours. After some initial resistance, they eventually 
succeeded in finding a solution using 3D modelling to produce digital 
prototype designs for the sub-assemblies.  
 
Operational integration phase. A joint BAA and BA team worked over three 
years to ensure that systems, people and processes would be prepared for 
the opening. The “start-finish” team worked during six months of systems 
testing and operational trials prior to opening, including 72 proving trial 
openings, each involving 2,500 people, to prepare workers, processes, 
systems and facilities for the public opening at  4.00am on 27
th March 2008.  
 
BAA’s research on previous airport projects and programs recognized that the 
opening could be disrupted by a “passive operator who will just stand back”, 
rather than one who “gets in early, operates early, steals this off you, takes all 
the learning, does final commission, and witnesses all the testing” 
(Wolstenholme, 2006). Despite being fully aware of the possible risks that 
could occur during opening, the BAA-BA team were unable to prevent the 
major difficulties arising when it opened for service on 27
th March 2008. In the 
five days after opening, BA misplaced 20,000 bags and cancelled 501 flights, 
incurring costs of around $31m. The terminal achieved the first full schedule 
of operations 12 days after opening. A Government report concluded that the 
chaotic opening could have been avoided through “better preparation and 
more effective joint working” between BAA and BA (House of Commons 
Transport Committee, 2008). A major cause of the problem was BA’s decision 
to press ahead with the opening in the knowledge that its staff had insufficient 
training and familiarity with the terminal’s facilities and baggage handling 





Although the project experienced problems when it opened for service, the 
project achieved its goals of designing and building a high-quality facility on 




A megaproject is an organizational response to extreme risk and uncertainty. 
At the outset, there may be a recognizable need for a project, but uncertainty 
about what ought to be done. In resolving this uncertainty, risks are identified 
and strategic decisions are made about how to proceed, including defining the 
overall project goals, governance structure and strategy for project delivery.  
 
The design, construction and operational delivery of a megaproject involve a 
combination of routine and innovative tasks and processes. Risks can be 
reduced through the preparation of routines in anticipation of known 
uncertainties, such as the well-known overruns on megaprojects and specific 
airport problems (e.g. problems of installing baggage handling systems 
disrupting openings). However, uncertainty reduction through innovation is 
required when unexpected happenings occur on a project, ranging from major 
events (e.g. a tunnel collapse, unexpected outcome from a planning inquiry, 
or extreme events such as 9/11) to smaller-scale emergent problems 
encountered on sub-projects.  
 
We now provide a discussion of the T5 case to examine the influence of the 
contractual framework required to address the risk-uncertainty and routine-
innovation dimensions of this and other megaprojects.  
 
Managing Risk and Uncertainty 
 
The decisions and learned behaviours that allow risk and uncertainty to be 
managed in projects are formed in the context of formal contracts. 
 
While planning for T5, BAA recognized that a new approach was required to 
cope with the scale and complexity of the project and long-gestation period for  
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approval to proceed. Many uncertainties could not be predetermined. It 
appreciated a standard commercial contract would not be effective. BAA had 
to develop a contractual approach which fostered a routine-driven culture and 
mindset necessary to identify, isolate and tackle risks, while providing flexible 
space for innovation and problem-solving when unusual happenings or 
unpredictable events occurred.  
 
BAA’s systematic research on construction and airport megaprojects found 
that major project overruns were associated with the use of a fixed-price 
contract. BAA was fully aware of the importance of distinguishing between risk 
and uncertainty. Under this contractual approach, the client issues an 
invitation to tender, receives several competitive bids, selects a bidder and 
develops a contract. The contract consists of a high-level description of the 
desired outcome and large volumes of pages outlining what happens if and 
when changes in scope occur or the project fails. The contract specifies how 
the client and contractors must address “known risks” that may emerge during 
project execution. Rather than seek to understand uncertainties, each bidder 
concentrates on the known risks and outbidding competitors by producing a 
low-cost submission.  
 
BAA identified an unresolved assumption of zero-sum thinking in commercial 
contractual contracting, which assumes that there will be a “winner and loser” 
on each project (Douglas, 2005). As Tony Douglas explained, “if these risks 
are so predictable, why did they keep replicating them from project to project, 
which takes you back to the same fundamental flaw in the game: somebody 
sees that they’ve got to win and somebody sees that they’ve got to lose” 
(Douglas, 2005). BAA’s research found due to the high-level of uncertainty 
inherent in megaprojects “the bidder can’t possibly know until you’re further 
down the line what the solution could remotely be like” (Douglas, 2005).  
 
BAA concluded that the only way to achieve a desired outcome on T5 was to 
“change the rules of the game” by creating a new type of agreement based on 
two fundamental principles: the client bears the risk and works collaboratively 




risks and uncertainties, whilst creating “an environment within which our 
suppliers can actually find solutions” (Wolstenholme, 2005). 
 
Risk bearing: The T5 Agreement is a form of cost-plus incentive contract, in 
which the client reimburses the costs incurred by the contractor plus pays a 
profit margin for exception performance. Unlike other forms of cost-incentive 
contracts where the risks are shared between the client and contractors, 
under the T5 Agreement BAA assumed full responsibility for the risk. Norman 
Haste, T5’s first Project Director, was primarily responsible for persuading 
BAA to hold the risk:  
 
“I persuaded BAA that they had to accept all the risk all the time. Given 
what was going on with the Public Inquiry – nobody knew what the 
outcome was going to be and the conditions imposed by the Inspector 
or Secretary of State – you could not pass the risk to the design teams 
or contractors” (Haste, 2006). 
 
Faced with such uncertainty at an early stage, the risk could not be 
transferred in a traditional contractual way because BAA could not possibly 
know what the solution would ultimately look like. It was decided that risks of 
not achieving a successful T5 would rest entirely with BAA.  
 
Around 75% of the £4.3bn total cost was procured using the T5 Agreement 
with its 80 first-tier suppliers. By removing the risk from first-tier suppliers, the 
contract was designed to avoid damaging adversarial practices associated 
with fixed-price contracts. Instead the T5 Agreement provided incentives to 
encourage teams to work collaboratively to create innovative solutions when 
problems were encountered, rather than seek additional payments or enter 
into legal disputes about scope changes.  
 
The T5 Agreement was a legal framework comprised of project execution and 
commercial principles. The execution principles for delivering the overall 
programme were laid down in the “Project Delivery Handbook” as repertoire of 
routines - predefined systems, and processes and collaborative behaviours.  
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The commercial principles ensured that suppliers were repaid all the costs on 
a cost transparent “open-book” basis and incentivized to improve their 
performance and innovate by bonuses for exceeding previously agreed 
“target costs” and completion dates. If the performance of a project exceeds 
target costs, the profits are shared among team members. This contractual 
approach was underpinned by routines to expose and manage risks rather 
than transfer or bury them and offered incentives for innovation and problem 
solving.  
 
Integrated project teams. BAA’s approach to risk and uncertainty was 
underpinned by a collaborative organizational approach mandated by 
contractual form. Integrated project teams were formed at the start of the 
planning inquiry to develop the overall design of the facility. The construction 
of T5 was conceived as a series of customer products delivered by teams. 
The aim was to create a “virtually integrated” supply chain composed of 
integrated project teams led by BAA staff or individuals from the consultants, 
contractor and other organizations. The T5 Agreement did not specify the 
work to be undertaken by first-tier suppliers. Rather it was a commitment from 
suppliers to provide capability when and where it was required on the project. 
This mechanism enabled BAA to select talented individuals with the 
competencies and experience to perform the specific tasks, irrespective of the 
needs of their parent company.  
 
The creation of virtual teams undermined any thoughts that risks could be 
transferred to an individual supplier and made it impossible to hold an 
individual supplier responsible for failure to achieve a project’s objectives. The 
teams were expected to work cooperatively towards achieving project goals 
by solving problems and acting on any learning gained, rather than “allocating 
blame or exploiting the failure or difficulties of others for commercial 
advantage” (Wolstenholme, 2008: 12). They were motivated by Richardson’s 
(1972) cooperation rather than Williamson’s (1975) “self-seeking with guile”. 
The success of each team was measured by the ability of individual members 
to work cooperatively to achieve high-levels of performance and manage 





Given the UK construction industry’s poor track record in managing large 
projects, the challenge of building T5 led by an inexperienced client and an 
untested supply chain was a huge risk for BAA. A core team was recruited or 
selected internally for their experience on other large UK and international 
projects. For example, senior BAA staff including three T5 project directors 
(Norman Haste, Tony Douglas and Andrew Wolstenholme) were headhunted 
by BAA because “they had a track record for completing projects and thrive on 
the cross-sharing of capability from best practices found in other industries” 
(Milford, 2006).  
 
Balancing Routines and Innovation 
 
As the case of T5 shows, risk and uncertainty in megaprojects can never be 
eliminated, but can be kept to a minimum by planning in advance and 
following carefully-prepared routines to reduce the possibility of predicted 
outcomes from occurring.  However, when megaprojects encounter unknown 
problems or emergent events – as they invariably always do – a well-
rehearsed, automatic or pre-programmed response is not always sufficient. 
Novel or unique solutions must be found to overcome obstacles to progress. 
Therefore, managing risk and uncertainty in megaprojects involves finding a 
judicious balance between performing routines and promoting innovation 
(Nelson and Winter, 1982). In the literature on organizational learning this is 
expressed as a trade-off between developing the capability to exploit 
repetitive processes to cope with risks, whilst being able to explore and 
implement customized solutions when unexpected happenings occur (March, 
1991).  
 
Routines. The scale, frequency and predictability of activities performed on a 
megaproject provide opportunities to develop repetitive and stable project and 
operational processes. These are routines that are structured in a controlled 
sequence, simplified into core repetitive tasks, based on standardized designs 





Routines must be devised to deal with fundamental risks that could hamper 
the progress of an entire project. Taking out an insurance policy, ensuring a 
favourable regulatory settlement to recover large fixed costs, and estimating 
future demand and revenues, are examples of high-level, standardized and 
routine responses that can be enacted and repeated during the planning 
phase of any megaproject.  
 
Routines are also required to deal with the well known risks and uncertainties 
during the design and integration of a high complexity “system of systems” or 
array project (Shenhar and Dvir, 2007). BAA adopted two routines to minimize 
the such risks during project delivery. First, it recognized that the overall 
conceptual design could not be frozen until the outcome of the planning 
inquiry was known. The longer the project gestation, the more unpredictable 
and vulnerable was the project to emergent events. Supported by the SME, 
the concept of progressive design fixity was introduced to freeze the design at 
the earliest possible moment, while maintaining the flexibility to make 
adjustments as circumstances changed.  Second, informed by its own 
research on megaprojects, BAA was fully aware that introducing new and 
unproven technologies on a complex project often results in significant cost, 
schedule and quality overruns. This “technological uncertainty” (Shenhar, 
1992) was addressed by creating pilot and trial processes to test new 
technologies in other operational environments, such smaller airport or BAA’s 
off-site testing facility at Heathrow (Gaines, 2006). 
 
Most routines are developed to perform the many stable and repetitive tasks 
involved in mitigating risks regularly encountered in day-to-day operations. 
BAA’s CIPP process and T5 Delivery Handbook are codified and replicable 
processes for project and programme delivery. BAA invested in the advanced 
visualization technologies based on the SME and complementary project 
management software to identify, diagnose, isolate and manage the risks 
involved in performing closely interdependent design, integration, fabrication 




programme. Pre-assembly, pre-fabrication and Just-In-Time techniques are 
examples of high-volume production routines used on T5.  
 
Even when organizations have identified the risks and understood a range of 
possible uncertainties that could be harmful to the progress of a project, they 
may not be able to avoid them. BAA was fully cognisant of the possibility that 
the opening of the airport terminal could be disrupted by the failure to follow 
carefully planned procedures and well-rehearsed routines. Despite identifying 
the systems, processes and trials required to prepare for the opening, BAA 
and BA failed to heed the lessons learnt from their study of unsuccessful 
airport projects. When the airport opened, BA’s staff lack of familiarity and 
preparedness caused huge disruption to service. In this example, the solution 
did not require innovation. The problem was eventually resolved by BAA and 
BA’s joint efforts to identify the causes of the problem and reinstate the 
routines necessary to achieve a full schedule of services.  
 
Innovation. In many cases, however, unexpected problems and opportunities 
to improve performance cannot be resolved by falling back on an existing 
repertoire of routines. These situations are so unexpected or unusual that 
they require new and innovative ways of solving them to achieve or exceed 
their performance targets. Our research identified two levels of organizational 
flexibility and innovative capability in response to uncertainty: the overall 
project (or programme) and sub-project levels.  
 
First, a major uncertainty or emergent event, which can threaten to hinder the 
progress of the project as a whole, requires a response from the senior 
members of the project and client organization. For example, when the 
Heathrow Express project came to a standstill after the tunnel collapse a 
solution was possible because the client’s project directors and managers had 
the freedom to implement and adapt the cost-reimbursable approach based 
on their experience of the Glaxco research facility and other megaprojects 
(Murray, 2005). This expert team of senior managers brought the intuitive 
judgement, experience and decision-making skills – which Leonard and Swap  
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(2005) call “deep smarts” – required to solve an immediate crisis and prepare 
for the future.  
 
Second, a megaproject is often executed as a programme broken down into 
major projects and sub-projects. As we illustrated by the example of the team 
comprised of LOR and Mott MacDonald, managers responsible for an 
individual project – within a larger programme – need the autonomy and 
freedom required to find solutions to problems or events that they encounter. 
Our research identified several other examples of integrated project teams 
working innovatively around problems that hindered their chances of success 
on specific sub-projects within the overall T5 programme, such as the use of 
digital modelling and construction of buildings and facilities, including air traffic 
control tower, airside road tunnel and main terminal roof. When organizations 
generate innovations to problems in this way, they tend to repeat them until 
they have become standardized and replicable routines for use within and 




Megaprojects are typified by low innovation and high risk, yet their success 
depends on increasing the former and decreasing the latter. A balance needs 
to be struck between routine and innovation based on clear identification of 
risks and uncertainties. Too great a focus on routine eliminates 
responsiveness to the inevitably unforeseen; too much focus on innovation 
leads to chaos. 
 
Our concern has been to examine the consequences of the contractual 
framework at T5 on the balance of innovation and routines. Lawyers and 
economists would adopt different perspectives, but our interest lies not with 
legal construction and interpretation nor economic consequences and 
choices. We are interested in understanding from the perspective of strategy 
and organization how innovation and routines managed to mitigate risks and 
uncertainties. A number of factors are influential. For example, the use of 




Learning from past experiences proved hugely valuable, and when this did not 
occur in the final operational stage, problems ensued.  
 
We have found that the contractual framework is critical to finding an 
appropriate balance between innovation and routines. Megaprojects require 
routines to address risks and create a space for innovation to cope with 
uncertainty. Routines create a consistency of approach – such as the CIPP, 
T5 Project Delivery Handbook, and progressive design fixity – to address risks 
identified prior to project execution. However, pre-specified and programmed 
routines are insufficient to cope with unusual events or happenings not 
previously identified during the planning phase. A megaproject must retain 
scope for variation and innovation in response to such uncertainty. In the T5 
case the contract provided a framework for a deliberative process and 
negotiated resolution to problems with and between suppliers to address 
unforeseen problems. Managers and organizations responsible for the overall 
project and sub-projects had the autonomy, flexibility and space to search, 
experiment and implement unique solutions to unexpected problems 




Appendix: Interviews on T5 
 
 
 Date  Interviewee  Affiliation  Job  title 
1  11/10/05  Simon Murray  ex BAA  ex T5 Project Director 
2 22/10/05  Tony  Douglas  BAA  Managing Director T5 (now MD 
HAL)  
3 29/11/05  Nigel  Harper  LOR  Director  Performance 
Improvement 
4 10/01/06  Andrew 
Wolstenholme 
BAA  T5 Project Manager & Project 
Director 
5  18/01/06  Mike Robins  LOR  Group Business Leader 
6 10/02/06  Ian  Fugeman  BAA  Head Rail and Tunnels T5 
7  13/02/06  Bill Frankland  LOR  Head of Roof Project, T5 
8  15/02/06  Timm Wellens  LOR  Phase 2 Production Leader 
9 15/02/06  Nigel  Harris  LOR  Digital  Prototyping 
10  15/02/06  Tony Blackler  LOR  Senior Construction Manager 
11  15/02/06  Gavin Milligan  LOR  3D Modeller 
12  15/02/06  Matthew Prentice  LOR  Production manager 
13 15/02/06  Damian  Leydon  LOR  Construction  Manager 
14  27/02/06  Steve Nuttall  LOR  CTRL project leader 
15 27/02/06  Spiros  Tsakonas  LOR 
(CORBER) 
Production Leader, C105  St 
Pancras Station CTRL 
16 27/02/06  Andrew  Williams  LOR  CTRL 
 
17 03/03/06  Phil  Wilbraham  BAA  Head Design, Building Projects 
18  10/03/06  Rob Stewart  BAA  Head Infrastructure projects T5 
19 21/03/06  Colin  Croft  ex  British 
Airways 
ex BA T5 Project Director 
20  29/03/06  John Milford  BAA  Head Buildings Projects T5 
21  04/04/06  Nick Gaines  BAA  Head Systems Integration 
Projects T5 
22 10/04/06  Liz  Daily  LOR  Head of Business Improvement 
Team 
23  10/04/06  Robert Hicks  LOR  3D/4D/5D and nD modelling 
24 10/04/06  Matt  Blackwell  LOR  3D/4D/5D and nD modelling 
25 10/04/06  Ray  O’Rourke  LOR  Owner 
26  05/05/06  Roy  Adams LOR Head  of  R@DD 
27  05/05/06  Jim Dennis  LOR  Brighton Marina Project 
28 05/05/06  Jacqui  Radford  LOR   
29  22/05/06  John Harris  BAA  3D modelling 
 
30  14/06/06  Norman Haste  ex BAA, now 
LOR 
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